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INTRODUCTION
Criminal justice policy, whether formulated by a police chief, state legisla-
ture, or the United States Supreme Court, is heavily influenced by policymak-
ers' opinions concerning the degree to which crime is responsive to criminal
sanctions. Until recently these opinions were uninformed by scientific re-
search findings on the relationship between sanctions and crime rates, simply
because little systematic empirical research had been performed. During the
last three decades, however, this situation has changed rather dramatically;
there have been literally hundreds of empirical studies on the effects of crim-
inal corrections programs on recidivism rates; more recently, there have been
scores of empirical studies dealing with the deterrence and incapacitation ef-
fects of punishment. The evaluation literature on correctional programs has
begun to play a major role in the evolution of correctional policy, and the
recent research on deterrence is receiving considerable attention;' indeed, sev-
eral sophisticated empirical studies of the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment were submitted in briefs to the United States Supreme Court during its
recent hearings on this issue.2
My purpose in this review is to explain what questions have been ad-
dressed in the recent research on the preventive effects of criminal sanc-
tions, indicate what techniques are being used to answer them, and give my
interpretation of what we have learned and can hope to learn through these
techniques. Beyond just summarizing current results, then, I hope to com-
nunicate a sense of how much confidence should be placed in these results.
The first section presents a brief overview of the literature on the influence of
* This research was supported in part by a grant from the United States Department of Justice.
Edward D. Jones 1I1, Daniel Nagin, James Q. Wilson, and Ann Witte offered a number of useful
suggestions on an earlier draft.
t Assistant Professor of Policy Sciences and Economics, Duke University, and Economic Consul-
tant to the Office of Policy and Planning, United States Department of Justice.
1. See Planner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, 44 PUB. INTEREST 104 (Summer 1976).
2. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in 7 LAW REPRINTS (Crim. Law Ser. No. 36)
250-60 (1975-76), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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criminal sanctions on the number of crimes committed by convicts. Incapacita-
tion, rehabilitation, and "dehabilitation" effects are discussed in the context of
a supply and demand model of crime. The second section presents a critique
of theoretical perspectives on the general preventive consequences of criminal
sanctions, with emphasis on the recent "economic" theories of criminal be-
havior and their relationship to more traditional formulations. Sections three
and four evaluate the two major sources of evidence on the deterrence effect
of criminal sanctions-correlational analysis and the analysis of "natural"
experiments-and summarize the findings of these studies. The final section
presents my conclusions concerning what we now know about the preventive
effects of punishment and the methods we have for gaining further infor-
mation.
I
THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF PUNISHMENT
The preventive effects of punishment can be classified as either "general"
or "special." The special effect of a punishment refers to its effect on the
amount of crime committed by the particular convict who is punished; the
general effect (discussed in subsequent sections) refers to its effect on every-
one else. A special effect could be achieved through any of several causal mech-
anisms. A prison term, for example, will incapacitate the prisoner by prevent-
ing him from committing crimes against the free community for the duration
of the term (though it seems that crime rates within prisons are high). Follow-
ing release, he may be less prone to commit crimes because of some rehabili-
tation or reformation process which occurred within prison, or because his
personal experience with prison has persuaded him that crime does not pay
(a mechanism known as "special deterrence"). It has also been argued that he
could be more crime prone following release due to a reduction in his legiti-
mate opportunities (stigmatization, depreciation of job skills), the acquisition
of criminal norms ("prisonization"), or an enhancement of his crime-related
skills. Other types of punishments could also produce some of these effects.
Of these possible effects, incapacitation is the least controversial. Unfortu-
nately, very little research has been done which attempts to estimate the mag-
nitude of the incapacitation effect.'
A great many evaluations of correctional programs designed to rehabilitate
convicts have been conducted in recent years, with disappointing results.
Robert Martinson summarized his now famous review of 231 correctional
evaluation studies conducted in the postwar era with this statement: "With few
and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had
3. One published estimate is in Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of
Juvenile Offenders Reduce Crime?, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 528 (1974); see also T. TABASZ, TOWARDS AN
ECONOMICS OF PRISONS 43-55 (1975).
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no appreciable effect on recidivism."4 The quest for a correctional technique which
would be effective in reducing recidivism rates was marked by an extraordi-
nary period of massive experimentation during the 1960s, much of it con-
ducted within the California penal system. Some techniques-intensive parole
supervision, community treatment of juveniles, group therapy within prison-
were evaluated through the use of true scientific experiments with subjects
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The failure of these
studies to demonstrate efficacy in reducing recidivism rates has been a major
impetus in the current trend away from indeterminant sentencing and the
"rehabilitative ideal."'5
It is safe to conclude that correctional rehabilitation programs, taken col-
lectively, have had a small effect on crime rates in the past, and that a
number of notable programs failed completely. But as long as it can be shown
that one or more existing, practical rehabilitation strategies can produce a
positive effect on convicts' behavior in the community, then rehabilitation re-
mains a viable objective for the correctional system. Ann Witte's evaluation of
the North Carolina work release program, reported in this symposium, gives
persuasive evidence that at least one such strategy does exist and deserves
consideration by every state correctional system.6
The various hypotheses which suggest that the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions may have the effects of increasing the post-release criminal activity of
convicts have not been so thoroughly tested, but available evidence places
them in doubt. A fairly straightforward prediction of the dehabilitation ar-
guments is that longer prison sentences will be associated with a higher post-
release recidivism rate, certeris paribus; both the "school of crime"7 and the
prisonization8 hypotheses postulate that a dysfunctional learning process oc-
4. Martinson. What Works---Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PuB. INTEREST 22
(Spring 1974). Martinson's conclusion is based on a subjective weighing of the evidence he re-
viewed; others who have evaluated this evidence believe that his conclusion is overly negative. See,
e.g., Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975); Halleck & Witte. Is
Rehabilitation Dead?,-CRIME AND DELINQUENCY-(forthcoming) 1977.
5. The failure of these studies to demonstrate rehabilitation has been thoroughly dlocu-
mented. See G. KASSENBAUM, D. WARD, & D. WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1971): P. LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL POLICY (1975): D. LIPTON, R. MIARTINSON, &
J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALU-
ATION STUDIES (1975). Ward. Evaliatio a Research fmr Corrections in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 184 (L.
Ohlin ed. 1973); Robinson & Smith, The Effectiveness oJ Corectional Progiams, 17 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 67-80 (1971). The impact of these findings on correctional policy is analyzed in Plat-
tter, supra note 1, at 104-10.
6. Witte, Work Release in North Carolina-A Program that Works?, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no.
1, at 230 (1977).
7. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 212-38 (1970).
8. An inmate is said to be "prisonized'" to the extent that he conforms to inmate rather than
staff norms. See D. CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMIMUNny 299-315 (1940).
An extensive review of the sociological literature (On prisonization is presented in G. HAWKINS,
THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 60 (1976). Hawkins notes that empirical tests of the prisoniza-
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curs in prison, and it would presumably be true that longer prison terms
produce more thorough learning.
The most thorough and persuasive study of the relationship between time
served and post-release recidivism was conducted by the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency (NCCD).9 The data base for this study consisted of a
nationwide sample of 104,182 male felons paroled for the first time on their
prison sentences sometime during the years 1965-1970. This sample was di-
vided into subsamples defined by two dimensions: crime for which they were
imprisoned, and whether or not they had prior convictions. Each subsample
was broken into pentiles according to length of time served before release,
and the first year parole success rate was calculated for each pentile."I
For the subsamples of violent offenders-those convicted of robbery, as-
sault, rape, manslaughter, or homicide-there is virtually no difference in
success rates across pentiles: Taking all violent crime categories together, the
success rate of those with no prior sentences drops from 88.8 per cent for the
first pentile (least time served) to 86.7 percent for the fifth pentile (longest
time served)." For those with prior sentences, the drop in success rate from
the first to the fifth pentile is even less-only 1.3 percent.1  For crimes of theft,
there is a more substantial drop in success rates as time served increases;
for example, the drop from the first to the fifth pentile for those with prior
sentences is four percentage points (70.2 per cent to 66.3 percent).13
Thus, while there does appear to be a relationship between parole success
and time served, it is very weak. Furthermore, this relationship may reflect
factors other than dehabilitation. For example, those who served relatively
long terms for a given crime were no doubt identified as poor risks by their
judges and parole boards, and were therefore systematically different than
those who served relatively short terms even before beginning their prison
terms.
tion theory have found that inmates' attitudes, as measured by questionaire responses, do not
reflect the development of prisonizatioll i the way suggested by Clemmer. Furthermore, there is
considerable evidence that the pattelns of inmate culture are determined not by prison conditions
but by factors associated with the prisoner's background in the comnmunity-that norms are
largely "imported." Because of these and other strands of evidence, Hawkins consigns the pris-
onization and -schools of crime" theories to the intellectual junk pile: "The prisonization
hypothesis did not die as the result of the administration of a skillful coup de grace. It suffered a
death by a thousand qualifications, so attenttated that even now there are those who are unaware
of its demise." Id. at 63.
9. D. GOTTFREDSON, M. NEnIHERCUri-, J. NUFFIELD, & V. O'LEARY, FOUR THOUSAND
LIFETIMES: A STUDY OF TIME SERVED AND PAROLE OUTCOMES (1973).
10. "Success" in this case was defined to nean "continued on parole," i.e., not returned to
prison or absconded. The parole success rates were adjusted by a statistical procedure for the
effects of the age of the parolees, to eliminate that source of variation in success rates.
I 1. D. GOTTEREDSON, M. NEITHERCUTT, J. NUFFIELD, & V. O'LEARY, supra note 9, at 23.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id. at 21.
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Other studies 14 have had findings similar to those of the NCCD project. It
would appear that, if there is a dehabilitation effect for adult prisoners, it is
weak or masked by other effects-though it is hard to imagine what they
might be. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that incarceration does not
influence the criminality of convicted juvenile delinquents in a measurable
way: An analysis of the California Community Treatment Project data dem-
onstrated that juveniles placed on probation immediately following conviction
had at least as high a crime rate as a group of juveniles who had been re-
leased from a reformatory." Since, in other respects, the two groups were
supposed to be identical, having been sorted between reformatory and proba-
tion by a random process, this result is strong evidence against dehabilitation
for juveniles.
It has been argued that the stigma of a criminal record will reduce the
legitimate opportunities available to a convict and thereby increase his pro-
pensity to commit crimes. 6 This argument differs from the dehabilitation ar-
guments in that it does not necessarily imply any relationship between time
served and post-release success-the conviction itself confers the stigma, and
it is doubtful that the length of the prison sentence would make much differ-
ence. The evidence for the "stigma effect" is indirect (indeed, it is hard to
imagine how a direct empirical test could be conducted), consisting of inter-
views with employers and other data which suggest that many jobs are closed
to ex-convicts, either de facto or de jure.'7 As I have argued elsewhere,' 8
however, the job categories which exclude ex-convicts tend to be jobs with a
relatively high salary and degree of responsibility-jobs for which most ex-
convicts would not be eligible even if they lacked a criminal record, simply
because most of them lack the education and skill requirements for such jobs.
Parolees are successful for the most part in finding jobs; although these jobs
tend to be menial and poorly paid, they do not appear to be substantially
inferior to jobs which nonconvicts with similar education, skill, and experience
are able to obtain. While this type of argument does not settle the issue of
whether the stigma effect may be important, it does cast doubt on its im-
portance.
The extensive literature, summarized above,'" on whether incarceration
14. Id. at 7; Mulvihill & Tumin, Crimes of Violence, in NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, A STAFF REPORT 561-67 (1969). For other citations and a somewhat
different conclusion, see Levin, Policy Evaluation and Recidivism, 6 L. & Soc'Y REV. 17 (1971).
15. Lerman, supra note 5, at 58-67.
16. H. MILLER, THE CLOSED DOOR: THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL RECORD ON EMPLOYMENT WITH
STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC AGENCIES (Nat'l Technical Info. Serv. Pub. No. PB207680, 1972).
17. Id.; R. TAGGART Il, THE PRISON OF UNEMPLOYMENT: MANPOWER PROGRAMS FOR
OFFENDERS (1972); Friedman & Pappas, The Training and Employment of Offenders in PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, 1967.
18. Cook, The Correctional Carrot: Better Jobs jor Parolees, I POL'Y ANALYSIS II (1975).
19. My summary is not comprehensive, and slights, among others, the extensive body of so-
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and other criminal sanctions increase or reduce the amount of crime commit-
ted by convicts, has for the most part failed to pose the larger question: If a
criminal's career is modified by a spell of incarceration (through some combi-
nation of incapacitation and rehabilitation effects, say), does this change pro-
duce a corresponding change in the overall crime rate? Ernest van den
Haag " has recently pointed out that, even abstracting from general deter-
rence and other general preventive effects, we cannot be sure that a change
in an individual convict's behavior is reflected in an equal net change in the
total amount of crime. His argument is that the amount of some types of
crime may be limited by the number of profitable opportunities to commit the
crime, rather than by the number of people who are prone to commit the
crime. "The crime rate is fairly independent of the incapacitation of actual
offenders as long as an unlimited number of potential offenders is willing to
replace them as soon as net benefits suffice-when the supply of offenders is
elastic."2
His argument is clearly valid for crimes which involve the production and
sale of illicit commodities. The sudden incapacitation or rehabilitation of 20
per cent of the prostitutes, numbers runners, and illicit drug dealers in New
York City may cause a temporary disruption in these activities. But we would
expect that eventually they would be almost entirely replaced and/or that the
remaining people in these occupations would step up their level of activity to
make up the deficit because this is the normal supply response to the initial
increase in price that would result from the withdrawal of some suppliers.
This reasoning has motivated a recommendation that law enforcement efforts
to reduce heroin use be redirected to focus on the demand side rather than
the supply hierarchy. "[T]he key element in the heroin market will not be the
poppy grower, the heroin smuggler, or the drug dealer. There are any
number of alternative ways to perform each of these functions. The indis-
pensable element is the heroin user. 2 2
This argument can be applied to any type of crime where the supply and
quality of criminal opportunities is responsive to the amount (supply) of
crime. For crimes of theft, for example, the quality of opportunities available
is presumably a function of the effort that potential targets devote to protect-
ing their property, and this amount of effort will in turn depend on the risk
of victimization. To the extent that businesses and households buy locks and
ciological literature dealing with "labelling theory." The major assertion of this theory is that
officially labelling a person as a criminal by arresting and convicting him may change his concep-
tion of himself and society in such a way as to propel him into a career of crime. See C. SCHRAG,
CRIME AND JUSTICE: AMERICAN STYLE 89 (1971). This theory would appear to be virtually untest-
able, as pointed out by J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 75 (1975).
20. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975).
21. Id. at 55. Though Van den Haag does not mention it, his point applies almost as well to
rehabilitation, dehabilitation, and stigmatization as it does to incapacitation.
22. Wilson, Moore, & Wheat, The Problem of Heroin, 29 PUB. INTEREST 21 (Fall 1972).
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alarms, guard their property, keep valuables in the bank, minimize the
amount of cash they have on hand, and so on, the quality of criminal oppor-
tunities will be reduced, because more effort and skill will be required to steal
a given amount of property.23 Casual observation suggests that the care exer-
cised by potential victims is positively related to the risk of victimization; the
one empirical study of which I am aware offers support for this notion.24 The
quality of opportunities for the theft of merchandise, as opposed to cash, also
adjusts to the quantity of theft through the forces of supply and demand in
the black market.
The complete argument is illustrated by Figure I for the case of theft.
Abstracted from deterrence and other general preventive effects of punish-
FIGURE I
v = S(w)
v = .8S(w)
W1 W2 w
(average wage rate for
theft activities)
23. The amount which businesses and households invest in self-protection is quite possibly as
large as the amount spent in public protection activities-police, courts, and corrections. One
estimate placed a lower bound on private expenditures in 1970 at $3.3. billion (two-thirds of the
public outlay), but many of the minor expenses and inconveniences of defensive living were
omitted from this estimate. See Bartel, An Analysis of Firm Demand for Protection Against Crime, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 443-78 (1975).
24. Id. Bartel found that the probabiiity that a business employed a guard increased with the
victimization rate of similar businesses in the same geographic area.
(theft victim-
ization rate)
replacement
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ment, the equilibrium level of theft in a particular jurisdiction is determined
by the intersection of two schedules: (1) the theft supply schedule S which
relates the theft rate to the average wage w of time spent in theft activity. The
amount of theft is assumed to increase with w, other things being equal; (2)
the theft opportuni, schedule D which relates the average wage w to the theft
victimization rate. As the probability of being victimized increases, potential
victims are assumed to reduce the amount of cash and other valuables they
keep on hand and to purchase locks, dogs, safes and other means of protect-
ing what they do keep-thus reducing the average reward to theft activities.
If 20 per cent of thieves are suddenly incapacitated, the theft supply
schedule shifts from S to .8S, causing (I assume) an initial 20 per cent reduc-
tion in the theft rate. However, the resulting reduction in the probability of
being victimized causes potential victims to devote less effort to defending
their property, which in turn stimulates theft activity among those thieves who
are not incapacitated. The new equilibrium will involve a reduction of less
than 20 per cent in the theft rate. Manipulation of the S and D curves dem-
onstrates that if either D is vertical (theft opportunities unresponsive to the
victimization rate) or S is horizontal (thieves are unresponsive to the average
reward to theft activity), the replacement effect will be zero-the incapacita-
tion effect will be fully reflected in the crime rate. Conversely, incapacitation
will have no effect on the theft rate ifS is vertical or D horizontal.
One caveat should be noted. It is possible that individual self-protection
measures will improve rather than reduce the quality of crime opportunities.
If, for example, fear of mugging keeps most people off the street at night,
those people who still choose to walk are not protected by the nearby pres-
ence of fellow citizens. In this circumstance, robbery may be a more attractive
crime than if most people did not choose to protect themselves.
What can be concluded from this discussion of the direct effects of
punishment on convicts? First, currently available evidence suggests that re-
habilitation, prisonization, stigmatization, and other such hypothesized effects
of the criminal corrections system appear to be weak in practice, though the
hope remains that moderately effective rehabilitation methods do exist and
could be implemented on a wider scale. 25 Second, while it can plausibly be
argued that the total incapacitation effect may be large, there are no good
estimates of its magnitude currently available. Third, incapacitation, rehabili-
tation, and other special effects of punishment will not be fully reflected in
the crime rate if a replacement process similar to a market adjustment process
is operative. While it may be true (as Van den Haag argues) that aberrant
crimes committed by psychopaths can be reduced on a one-for-one basis by
incapacitation, other types of crime which are motivated by a nondeviant
25. Witte, supra note 6.
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quest for pecuniary enrichment may not be reduced substantially in the long
run by incapacitation alone.
II
GENERAL PREVENTIVE EFFECTS
The above discussion of the direct effects of criminal sanctions on the
amount of crime committed by those who are subjected to such sanctions serves
to clear the decks for an analysis of the general preventive effects of criminal
sanctions: those "restraining influences emanating from the criminal law and
the legal machinery"2 6 which operate through the threat of punishment rather
than through its direct effects on those convicts who are subjected to it. Hypo-
thetical general preventive mechanisms include the Bentham-Beccaria notion
of simple deterrence, in addition to more subtle mechanisms which have a psy-
chological or sociological basis. Zimring and Hawkins assert, for example, that
the threat of punishment can be a teacher of right and wrong, a stimulant to
habitual law-abiding conduct, a mechanism for building respect for the law,
and a rationale for conformity. 27
Analysis of these general preventive mechanisms by legal scholars and so-
cial scientists forms one evidentiary basis for criminal justice policy. Ideally,
policymakers would want to be informed not only of the qualitative effects of
changes in the threat level (will an increase in the average severity of sanction
for drunk driving reduce the incidence of this crime?), but also the mag-
nitude of these effects. Increasing the certainty and severity of punishment
typically imposes increased costs on the public fisc and, of course, on vio-
lators. These costs must be justified by a belief that the benefits (in the form
of reduced crime rates) are sufficiently large that the change is worthwhile.2 8
Furthermore, a complete evidentiary basis for policy would provide informa-
tion on how changes in the threat of punishment affect different groups in
the population (juveniles versus adults, poor versus middle class, those who
already have a criminal record versus those who don't), and on the relative
effectiveness of threats in restraining different types of crime. Other informa-
tion requirements include the lags in the impact of changes in threat level,
and the degree to which the process by which legal sanctions are imposed has
influence on their effectiveness-as would be salient, for example, if the
strength of the preventive effects were influenced by the perceived legitimacy
26. J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 34 (1974).
27. F. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 77-89
(1973). J. Gibbs, supra note 19, at 68, uses the terms "habituation," "normative validation," and
"enculturation."
28. Thus the appropriate policy question in the literature on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment is not "Does capital punishment deter homicide?" but rather (perhaps) "Does capital
punishment deter homicide by enough to justify incurring the chance of errors or injustice in its
imposition?"
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of the process or the ability of the process to communicate an immediate
sense of threat to potential criminals.
It should be clear to anyone familiar with the literature that these eviden-
tiary requirements of informed criminal justice policymaking are far from
being met by the current state of the art. Until quite recently, the discussion
of general preventive mechanisms has been based largely on a priori reason-
ing, casual observation, and indirect evidence from psychology and the social
sciences. Mainly during the last decade, this type of analysis has been sup-
plemented by systematic empirical studies of the relationship between threat
levels and crime rates. This recent literature is reviewed in the next two sec-
tions, but my conclusion can be stated now: There is strong evidence from
some of these studies that an increase in the threat of punishment can reduce
the amount of some crimes in some circumstances, but very little evidence
about the long-term effects, the typical magnitudes involved, the relevance of
process, the responsiveness of juveniles to threats, or the extent to which
some important crime categories (such as murder) are responsive to changes
in the threat level. Furthermore, the intrinsic difficulties of this empirical
work made it highly unlikely that anything like a complete scientific basis for
criminal justice policy will be produced in the foreseeable future. Under these
circumstances, a priori arguments and indirect evidence on human nature
and criminal behavior remain an important source of information. A case in
point is the recent majority opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, which noted the in-
conclusiveness of statistical studies of the deterrent effect of the death pen-
alty, but then went on to assert:29
We may . . . assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in
passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for
many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There
are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the pos-
sible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the
decision to act. And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by
a life prisoner, where other sanctions may not be adequate.
The remainder of this section will present a brief characterization of de-
terrence theory as developed in recent years by economists. The subsequent
section will consider other general preventive mechanisms and contrast the
implications of such mechanisms with the implications of the economic theory.
The brief characterization of the economic theory presented here gives the
main ideas without reproducing the highly mathematical method of argumen-
tation. 31
29. 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976).
30. A technical overview of this literature is J. Heineke, Economic Models of Criminal Be-
havior: Implications (1976) (unpublished paper on file at Institute of Policy Sciences and Public
Affairs, Duke University). Important contributions to this literature include Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON, 169 (1968); Block & Heineke, A Labor Theo-
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It is no surprise that this recent development in the economics literature
harks back to Bentham: "[T]he profit of the crime is the force which urges a
man to delinquency: the pain of the punishment is the force employed to
restrain him from it. If the first of these forces be the greater the crime will
be committed; if the second, the crime will not be committed.13 t The threat
of punishment is in effect a government-imposed tax on criminal activity; the
higher this tax, the fewer the criminal opportunities which will be deemed
worthwhile by potential criminals.
There are of course several complications that have to be taken into ac-
count. First, the "tax" is imposed with some probability less than one, and its
magnitude (the severity of sentence) is also highly uncertain in practice. Thus
the decision whether to commit a crime is analagous to a decision whether to
gamble, play the stock market, and so on; it depends on the individual's per-
ception of the risks and the degree to which he is averse to taking risks.
Second, information on the true magnitude of the "tax" (i.e., the actual prob-
ability and severity of punishment for a particular crime) is communicated in
a very haphazard fashion. Perceptions of this threat may differ widely among
potential criminals, and may be only loosely related to the true threat level. It
may be important in some circumstances, then, to maintain a distinction be-
tween perceived and actual threat levels in developing the implications of the
theory (though this has not been done).3 2 Third, the severity of a given
punishment (e.g., one year in prison) will be measured differently by people
with differing tastes and circumstances; the person with a high standard of
living and a good reputation has much more to lose from incurring this sen-
tence than does a reprobate. Fourth, for crimes which require a substantial
amount of time to plan and execute, the opportunity cost of a man's time
(legitimate wage rate) will influence his perception of profitability.
For these four reasons, then, a given criminal opportunity will look more
"profitable" to some than to others even if we abstract from interpersonal
differences in moral outlook. But for all rational potential criminals, it will be
true that any of the following changes should have a deterrent effect: an
increase in the perceived probability or severity of punishment, an increase in
the effort required to commit a crime, a reduction in the payoff to crime, or
retic Analysis of the Criminal Choice, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 314 (1975); Block & Lind, A n Economic
Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479 (1975); Ehrlich, Participation in
Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. 81 J. POL. ECON. 521 (1973).
31. 7 J. BENTHAM WORKs 399 (1843), quoted in F. Zimring & G. Hawkins, sipra note 27 at 75.
32. One possibly important mechanism by which an individual's perceptions of the threat level
may be modified is by actually being subjected to a criminal sanction. Actually experiencing a
prison sentence may increase the criminal's perception of the severity of this punishment, and
persuade him that "crime does not pay." It is my impression that it is this possibility of a
punishment-induced change in perception of the legal threat to crime that distinguishes the term
"special deterrence" fiom reformation or rehabilitation. It is difficult to distinguish between these
mechanisms empirically.
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an improvement in legitimate economic opportunities. 33
These qualitative implications follow from a theoretical analysis of rational
behavior under uncertainty which has also been applied to a number of other
economic choices; the approach assumes, then, that in its essential aspects
the crime choice is not unique, and that there is no need to presuppose a dis-
tinctive set of motivations in analyzing criminal behavior. Even "deviant"
crimes of sex and violence and noninstrumental crimes (illicit drug use) are
readily analyzed within this framework, though the notion of how to de-
fine the "payoff" to such crimes becomes a bit murky. The implications of
the theory with respect to deterrence are not changed, but are of course re-
stricted to that segment of the population which derives enjoyment from
such activities.
34
One interesting application of the theory is to the old question of whether
changes in the certainty of punishment can be expected to have a greater
effect than changes in the severity of punishment. First, the question has been
restated more precisely: Is the elasticity of the crime rate with respect to a
change in the probability of punishment greater than the elasticity with re-
spect to a change in the severity of punishment?35 For example, would a 20
per cent increase in the probability of being imprisoned for committing a
burglary (an increase from, say, a probability of .05 to .06) cause a greater
reduction in the burglary rate than a 20 per cent increase in the average
length of the prison term (an increase, say, from ten months to twelve
months)? The answer which follows from the theory in one important circum-
stance is clearly no. If the typical severity of punishment for a particular
crime is insufficient to make that crime unprofitable, and the punishment
were to be applied with certainty, then changes in the actual probability will
not influence the amount of that crime. Increases in severity, on the other
hand, may have an effect. This point is salient to those large urban jurisdic-
tions that are increasingly following the practice of giving probation to con-
victed robbers and burglars who lack a felony record ("the first one is free").
In cases where severity is sufficiently great, on the other hand, the theoret-
ical answer conforms with the conventional wisdom in this matter. If potential
criminals "discount" the future, then the threat of a two-year prison sentence
with probability .10 will be a less effective deterrent than the threat of a one-
33. The results are not so clear-cut if we ask what effect these changes have on the rate at
which people will commit crimes. See Block & Heineke, supra note 30.
34. This segment may be larger than we would like to admit. J. ANDENEAS, supra note 26, at
20, notes: "That rape . . . is a crime not alien to the normal human personality, can be verified in
times of war and occupation. In an occupation army where discipline in this matter is lax, the
incidence of rape is commonly high."
35. Block & Lind, supra note 30, at 490. "Elasticity" is a measure of the responsiveness of one
variable to changes in another: in particular, the "elasticity of crime with respect to the severity of
punishment" is defined as the percentage change in the crime rate which would result if the
severity of punishment were increased by one per cent.
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year sentence with probability .20; the elasticity of crime with respect to prob-
ability will be less than the elasticity with respect to severity.
36
The economists' work on the general deterrence mechanism has been use-
ful in developing the implications of a long neglected notion in criminology
literature-that criminals can be viewed as rational decision makers intent on
furthering their personal welfare in an environment which provides crime
opportunities coupled with sanction threats. While this approach has proved
productive, its focus on rational decision making neglects socialization pro-
cesses which may also be important in determining crime rates. The next sec-
tion argues that the economic model in some cases yields different predic-
tions than the "socialization model," suggesting that the economists' focus on
general deterrence may be excessively narrow.
A. Other General Preventive Mechanisms
Other general preventive mechanisms have been discussed at length in a
number of recent publications,3 7 and there is no need to restate the argu-
ments here. It is interesting, however, to note the potential conflicts between
the predictions which follow from consideration of these mechanisms and the
apparent implications of the simple deterrence formulation.
1. Lags in the Effect
While the simple deterrence theory presumes that changes in the threat
level will have their full impact on crime rates the moment these changes are
perceived by potential criminals, 38 effects which operate through other
mechanisms may not have their full impact for some years. It has often been
asserted, for example, that law-abiding behavior is habitual for many people
and that force of habit precludes them from taking advantage of profitable
criminal opportunities even if they are virtually risk-free. If an effective crim-
inal justice system is one stimulant to individuals initially acquiring this habit,
then the possibility arises that an era of mild and infrequently applied crimi-
nal sanctions may produce a whole generation of people who fail to see any
36. Id. at 489. The authors argue, using the same assumptions, that increasing the variability
of sentences reduces the deterrent effect of a given average length of sentence-an argument for
determinant sentencing.
37. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); J. ANDENAES, supra note 26; E.
VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 20; J. GIBBS, supra note 19; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 27.
38. It should be noted that additional lags may occur if the supply of criminal opportunities is
slow to respond to initial changes in the crime rate caused by the change in the threat level. For
example, homeowners may respond only slowly to a reduction in the burglary rate. Eventually
they would be expected to reduce their expenditures on self-protection, thus increasing the qual-
ity of burglary opportunities, but it is doubtful that this response would occur as quickly as the
initial deterrence effect. If these suppositions are correct, then the initial drop in the burglary
rate due to the increase in sanction threat will be followed by a partial remission as burglars find
that opportunities have become more attractive.
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rational reason to acquire the habit of law-abiding behavior. The ramifications
of this failure could be reflected in the crime rate for years, even if a subse-
quent increase in the effectiveness of the system were achieved. Similarly, if
criminal law and the effectiveness with which it is enforced shape the
framework for the moral education of youth, then a reduction in the effec-
tiveness of law enforcement may contribute to the production of an amoral,
crime-prone generation: "It would be difficult to teach honesty, nonviolence,
and similar positive values in a society where these rules were openly and
commonly broken without punishment."" a In both the mechanisms of habit-
formation and moral education, then, an initial failure in deterrence produces
long-term consequences for the crime rate.
One implication of these hypothesized lags in the general preventive effect
of law enforcement is that the full magnitude of a change in the threat level
cannot be assessed by observing its apparent short-term influence on the ap-
propriate crime rate. Indeed, the virtual impossibility of measuring directly
the full, long-run effect suggests once again the importance of a priori reason-
ing and indirect evidence. The notion that "crime breeds crime"-especially if
the crime in uncompensated by punishment-is a powerful one and should be
given more serious attention by scholars.
2. The Importance of Severity in Punishment
The legislated (and actual) severity of penalty for a particular offense may
influence the public's feeling for the seriousness or moral repugnance of this
offense. The famous quote from Stephen expresses the point well:
41
Some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if they
committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands abstain
from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard
it with horror is, that murderers are hung with the hearty approbation of all
reasonable men.
Murderers are no longer hung; in fact, the median time served in prison by
those convicted of homicide before their release on parole is less than five
years. 41 Andenaes notes that "in the long run, such a reduction in penalty
might also reduce the inhibitions against committing murder in situations
39. J. ANDENAES, supra note 26, at 124. An interesting bit of evidence is that Reiss and
Rhodes, in their study of juvenile delinquency in Nashville, found that the delinquency rate of
upper class boys was heavily influenced by the delinquency rate of the neighborhood in which
they lived. Reiss & Rhodes, The Distribution of Juvenile Delinquency in the Social Class Structure, 26
AM. Soc. REv. 720 (1961).
40. J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863).
41. D. GornrREDSON, M. NEITHERCUTT, J. NUFFIELD, & V. O'LEARY, supra note 9, at 17. It was
recently reported that twenty per cent of those convicted of homicide in New York City were
freed on probation. An additional fifty-nine per cent of those convicted of homicides received
prison sentences that would make them eligible for parole in three years or less. N.Y. Times,
January 27, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
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where murder seems a tempting escape from a situation of emotional con-
flict.
4 2
The issue for our purposes is whether considering the moralizing influ-
ence of a severe penalty might change the conclusions concerning the relative
magnitudes of the responsiveness of crime to changes in the probability and
severity of punishment which follow from an analysis of simple deterrence. In
the long run, for those crimes in which "moral inhibition" plays an important
role, maintaining high severity may be more important than a high probabil-
ity of punishment.
3. Other Characteristics of the Law Enforcement Process
I have argued that the moralizing influence of law enforcement may in-
fluence the public's attitudes towards illegal activities and hence the propen-
sity to engage in such activity. A related but logically distinct mechanism by
which law enforcement activities may inhibit crime is through the influence of
these activities on the public's respect for the law as such. If the process by
which laws are made and enforced is generally viewed as legitimate and just,
then many will obey the law simply out of a sense of obligation to honor its
authority. The economist's term for this is "honesty preference," which will
"bias" people's decision in favor of law-abiding behavior. 43 Behaviorally, this
preference would mean that an individual would abstain from illegal behavior
unless such behavior was perceived as sufficiently profitable (net of the threat
of punishment and other considerations) to overcome the individual's prefer-
ence for doing things legally.
The importance of honesty preference in inhibiting criminality is well ex-
pressed by Andenaes: 4 4
A certain degree of respect for the formal law is probably essential for the
smooth functioning of society. Where it is lacking, law enforcement agencies
play a role similar to that of an occupying army in foreign territory, a com-
parison which has been made often enough with regard to the law enforce-
ment agencies in the ghettos of American cities. Experience shows than an
occupying army may be able to create a high degree of order and compliance
if it is prepared to use sufficiently harsh terror methods. But such a reign of
terror is fundamentally different from the system we are used to in democrat-
ic societies.
The arguable importance of respect for the law adds a new dimension to
the relationship between law enforcement efforts and the degree of com-
42. J. ANDENAES, Supra note 6, at 59. The "reduction in penalty" which he is hypothesizing in
this paragraph is a reduction to "three or four years imprisonment.'"
43. Block & Heineke, supra note 30. One would suppose that the stigma of being convicted of
a crime in a community which generally had respect for the law would be greater than in a
community where such respect was lacking, and that communitv-wide respect for the law would
thereby increase the deterrence value of criminal sanctions.
44. J. ANDENAES, supra note 26, at 116.
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pliance with the law: Respect is influenced by the manner in which the law is
enforced. If enforcement efforts are viewed as corrupt, arbitrary or (worse)
biased, unresponsive to the needs of the community, and liable to error, 45
then disrespect for the law and the prohibitions which the system enforces is
likely to be a natural consequence.
46
The implication of this argument is that the general preventive effect of
law enforcement efforts are not transmitted through the probability and sev-
erity of punishment alone, but also by the public's perception of the quality of
the process which produces these threats. 4
7
B. Summary
The general preventive effects of criminal sanctions may operate through
several mechanisms. The simple deterrence mechanism has been formulated
in terms of a rigorous model of economic choice under uncertainty which
draws on and derives its credibility from the close analogy between criminal
behavior and various sorts of legitimate economic behavior that are subject to
uncertain payoffs. The economists have failed to note that the predictions
which follow from analysis of this mechanism should not be viewed as identi-
cal to the general preventive effects of the criminal sanction. I have pointed
out that some of the implications of other preventive mechanisms are not
entirely consistent with the implications of a simple deterrence model.
The arguments concerning the qualitative effects of these mechanisms are
persuasive to the extent that they are consistent with one's beliefs concerning
human nature, the socialization process, attitude formation, and so on. This
type of a priori reasoning would ideally be tested through careful empirical
research which would also provide a basis for estimating the magnitude of the
predicted effects. In practice, as will be explained below, the inherent difficIl-
ties of making valid estimates of such magnitudes suggest that criminal justice
decisionmakers will be forced to continue to rely mainly on "plausibility" ar-
guments concerning these magnitudes when formulating policy. A modest but
45. The simple deterrence effect of sanctions is also weakened to the extent that potential
criminals believe that the criminal justice systen is prone to punish innocent people. In an ex-
treme case, if the probability of being punished were perceived as unrelated to guilt or inno-
cence, the law would have no deterrent effect.
46. For evidence, see Friedland, Thibaut. & Walker, Some Determinants of the Violation oJ Rules,
3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 103 (1973). The authors conducted a laboratory experiment to measure
the effect on rule violations of the probability and severity of sanctions and the "fairness" of the
surveillance methods. Surveillance methods which were perceived as unfair generated a higher
rate of rule violations than fair surveillance methods, ceteris paribus.
47. Note the error in Harris, On the Economics of Law and Order, 78 J. POL. EcoN. 165 (1970).
He assumes that legal safeguards for criminal suspects will increase the supply of criminal of-
fenses, other things (including the probability and severity of punishment) being equal. The argu-
ment should be that such safeguards, if they are viewed as enhancing the legitimacy of the process,
will reduce crime if they do not reduce the probability and severity of punishment.
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important role for empirical research would be to limit the range of assertions
concerning the preventive effects of punishment which can be viewed as
plausible by policymakers.
III
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF DETERRENCE I:
CORRELATIONAL STUDIES
The preferred method for testing hypotheses and measuring the mag-
nitude of causal relationships is to conduct random experiments in which the
experimental treatment is administered to randomly selected subsets of the
sample of experimental subjects and the remainder of the subjects serve as
controls."' As mentioned above,49 such experiments have been conducted to
test the efficacy of various criminal rehabilitation methods. However, there
are virtually insurmountable practical problems in conducting random exper-
iments to measure the general preventive effects of punishment outside the
laboratory.50 The "subjects" in such an experiment would be jurisdictions-
precincts, counties, or states, for example-and the relevant criminal justice
authorities would have to submit themselves to experimental control. Political,
ethical, and legal problems appear to preclude such an experimental design in
most cases. A rare exception to this rule is the Kansas City Preventive Patrol
Experiment, which is discussed in the next section.
The principal alternatives to random experimentation are (1) studying
"quasi-experiments"-usually a sudden and dramatic change in the sanction
threat level, as in the case of a police strike or a major change in the law, and
(2) correlational studies which analyze the relationship (if any) between threat
levels and crime rates across jurisdictions or over time. Both of these methods
suffer from the same basic problem. If relationships between crime rates and
threat levels are found in the data, they are not necessarily the result of the
general preventive causal process. Other processes (which at least in principle
would be controlled in a true random experiment) are capable of generating
such relationships, and it is usually difficult to make a persuasive case that
some general preventive effect is responsible, in whole or in part, for patterns
in the data. While this problem is especially severe for correlational studies,
they do have certain advantages over studies of quasi-experiments, which ac-
count for their recent proliferation in the economics and sociology literature.
48. See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTS AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
RESEARCH (1963).
49. See note 5 supra.
50. Some interesting laboratory experiments have been conducted with human subjects to test
various hypotheses relating to deterrence. See Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, supra note 46, and
the references therein. One problem with laboratory experiments of course is that it is not clear
under what circumstances the results of such experiments are applicable to real life situations.
See the discussion of "external validity, D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 48, at 5.
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I begin this review of recent empirical work with a discussion of the correla-
tional studies, reserving my discussion of other studies for the next section. 5'
The main objectives of the correlational studies have been to test the im-
plications of the simple deterrence model and to estimate the magnitude of
the deterrence effect with respect to both the probability and severity of
punishment for a number of crimes. These studies typically are not con-
cerned with the technology of producing threats, and hence are not directly
relevant to policy. Knowing that an increase in the probability of imprison-
ment for robbery will reduce the robbery rate is helpful background informa-
tion to a policymaker, but it carries no direct implication about the potential
effects of varying the available criminal justice policy instruments; after all,
the probability that offenders will be arrested and jailed is not a variable
which can be directly manipulated by any criminal justice agency. How much
can this probability of imprisonment for robbery be increased by expanding
or redeploying the police force, soliciting citizen cooperation with the police,
expanding the prosecutor's staff or instituting a mandatory sentencing law?
The correlational studies are not designed to answer such specific questions,
but are focused instead on measuring the potential efficacy of a general ap-
proach to crime control. By abstracting from the details of the technology of
threat production, it is hoped that the underlying principle of general deter-
rence can be illuminated. 52
A. The Approach
The correlational studies of crime are intended to answer the following
question: If the probability and/or severity of punishment in some jurisdiction
(state, county) for some specified crime or group of crimes were changed,
what would be the direction and magnitude of the resulting change in the
rate of commission of that crime in that jurisdiction? The focus of interest
here is the partial effect of a change in the threat level when other factors
which influence the crime rate are "controlled for" or "held constant." For
example, the result may be in the form: "Other things equal, a five percent
reduction in the Manhattan burglary rate will result from a 10 percent in-
crease in the probability that a burglary will result in a prison term." If Man-
hattan actually did engineer such a change in this probability during the year
1977, the actual burglary rate would change by an amount which is deter-
mined by many factors (changes in economic conditions, demographic com-
51. For an excellent, comprehensive review of the findings, methods, and technical problems
with these studies see Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, MANAGEMENT
Scl. - (forthcoming 1977).
52. The correlational studies made the implicit assumption that the methods by which ajuris-
diction produces arrests, convictions, and sentences are irrelevant; that what matters is the result-
ing probability and severity of punishment which results from whatever methods are adopted.
This assumption is questionable, to say the least.
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position of the population, and so on,) in addition to the increase in threat
level to burglars. But if the study is correct, then the actual burglary rate
would be approximately five per cent lower than it would have been in the
absence of the increase in the threat level.
Virtually all the correlational studies have been motivated by an interest in
measuring the magnitude of the general deterrence effect. This focus has
dictated both the general statistical approach and the interpretation of the
results. In fact, however, it is usually not possible to measure a pure deter-
rence effect using this approach. If a negative (partial) relationship between
sanction threat levels and crime rates is observed over time or across a
number of jurisdictions at a single point in time, then the relationship may be
due to deterrence. But, especially if the typical mode of punishment is incar-
ceration, the relationship may also be due to incapacitation, rehabilitation, or
some combination of effects.
It should be noted that this problem does not make the results of such
studies any less interesting-estimates of the total preventive effect of pun-
ishment are at least as policy-relevant as estimates of the deterrence effect
alone. But the interpretation of such results is certainly not a matter of indif-
ference, either for scientific or policy purposes.5 3 In what follows, I will dis-
cuss the correlational studies as if they were studies of deterrence alone, since
that is the approach and interpretation used by their authors. But it should be
kept in mind that such an interpretation is misleading in most cases.
A recent survey of this literature explains the basic approach:5 4
General deterrence is inherently an aggregate phenomenon since it is re-
flected in the behavior of the entire population. Consequently, all analyses use
aggregate data on crime-commission rates, and examine the association of
commission rates with various sanctions measures. These are primarily: (1)
two measures of probability of apprehension (clearance rate and the ratio of
arrests to reported offenses), (2) a measure of probability of imprisonment
(the ratio of prison commitments to reported crimes) and (3) a measure of
severity of punishment (mean or median time served).
It has been shown in a variety of contexts that there is a negative association
between the rates of commission of the Index crimes and the probability of
arrest or incarceration; this result obtains for both cross section studies (com-
paring states, counties within a state, or precincts within a city) and time series
studies. These studies also show that the simple association between the sever-
ity of sentence and amount of crime is sometimes negative, but not consis-
tently so. 55
53. For a detailed discussion of the issues discussed in this paragraph, see J. GIBBS, supra note
19.
54. Nagin, supra note 51.
55. Id. Early correlational studies based on comparing crime rates with the probability and
average of incarceration across states include: Bean & Cushing, Criminal Homicide, Punishment, and
Deterrence: Methodological and Substantive Reconsideration, 52 Soc. Sci. Q. 277 (1971); Gibbs, Crime,
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These results are interesting but by no means conclusive evidence on the
deterrence hypothesis. Many factors influence the crime rate in a particular
jurisdiction and year, and these must be controlled for in some fashion if the
deterrence effect is to be partialled out and measured. A number of deter-
rence studies have attempted to control for other factors.
B. Controlling for Other Factors
The truism that observed crime rates are influenced by many factors out-
side the purview of the criminal justice system-socioeconomic and demo-
graphic characteristics of the jurisdiction's population, the propensity of vic-
tims to report crimes, and so on-creates two problems with the study of the
deterrence mechanism. First, it obscures the underlying relationship between
threat levels and crime rates by creating a great deal of "noise" in the data.
This problem of "noisy" data is readily handled through elementary statistical
techniques, and poses no real conceptual difficulty. It has the effect, however,
of reducing the precision of estimates of the magnitude of the deterrence
effect.
A second and much more serious difficulty introduced by the influence of
socioeconomic variables and other factors is the possibility that some of these
factors will distort the relationship between crime and criminal sanctions; i.e.,
that the systematic portion of the observed relationship will reflect the influ-
ence of other factors. For example, states differ with respect to the fraction of
their populations which are in the crime prone ages of fifteen to seventeen;
states with a relatively large youthful population will thereby tend to have a
relatively high crime rate. It is also true that juveniles are rarely sent to
prison; hence the fraction of a state's crimes which result in imprisonment will
tend to be small in a state with a disproportionately large amount of youth
crime. This "youth" variable could thus produce a negative interstate relation-
ship between crime and imprisonment probability, even in the absence of a
significant deterrence effect. And this type of distortion could be created by
many other variables as well. Clearly this is a serious problem if the deter-
rence effect is to be isolated and measured.5 6
Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SW. Soc. Sci. Q. 515 (1968); Tittle, Cinme Rates and Legal Sanctions,
16 Soc. PROB. 409 (1969).
56. See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra note 48, at 64 for a discussion of the relationship
between correlation and causation. A fascinating collection of examples from the medical litera-
ture and other sources which illustrates the dangers of inferring causation fron correlation is
Gilbert, Light, & Mosteller, Assessing Social Innovations.: A n Empirical Base for Policy, in BENEFIT-
COST AND POLICY ANALYSIS, 1974, 3 (R. Zeckhauser, A. Harberger, R. Haveman, L. Lynn, W.
Niskanan, A. Williams eds. 1975). Black concludes that the problem of controlling for other vari-
ables in assessing the deterrent effect of capital punishment from correlational studies of state data
is insurmountable: "A 'scientific-that is to say, a soundly based--conclusion is simply impos-
sible, and no methodological path out of this tangle suggests itself." C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 25 (1974).
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One conceptually simple solution to this problem is to compare crime rates
between jurisdictions which are similar in all important respects except the
probability and/or severity of punishment. Sellin attempted this approach in
his classic study of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 7 In one study
he selected six clusters of contiguous states, each cluster including at least one
retentionist and one abolitionist state. He argued that these states, because
they were contiguous, were "more nearly alike" with respect to "the nature of
their populations and their economic, social, and political conditions" than
would be geographically disparate states. 8 For these groupings there is no
clear tendency for the abolitionist states to have higher homicide rates than
the retentionist states for the forty-three year period observed by Sellin, lead-
ing him to conclude that the death penalty "in law or practice-does not in-
fluence homicide death rates."59
Sellin's conclusion is not persuasive, because even if each execution had
the effect of preventing eight murders (as Isaac Ehrlich has estimated),"' the
overall effect on the homicide rate of Sellin's retentionist states would be so
small as to be quite possibly swamped by the effects of other differences be-
tween the states in each comparison cluster. The reason is simply that the
retentionist states had very low execution rates, ranging from New Hamp-
shire, with one execution in the years 1920-1955, to Ohio, with an average of
seven executions a year."'
The second solution to the control problem in correlational studies pro-
vides the approach which has been used in all the econometric analyses of
deterrence: multivariate regression analysis.62 This approach requires the de-
velopment of a mathematical model that specifies the list of variables which
are thought to be important in explaining variations in crime rates, and that
specifies a linear equation which is hypothesized to haracterize the form of
the causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent
variable (the crime rate). The data is then used to estimate the parameters of
this equation (i.e., the coefficients of the explanatory variables); the estimation
procedure yields parameter values which give the closest possible "fit" be-
tween the equation and the observed values of the dependent variable.
57. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, (T. Sellin ed. 1967).
58. Id. at 135.
59. Id. at 138.
60. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death?, 65 AM.
ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
61. T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY 25, 28, 32 (1959). For a further discussion of Sellin's
methods, see Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Issac Ehrlich on the
Deterrent Effect of Captial Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and
Inference, in id. at 209; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 27, at 263.
62. For a thorough explanation of this technique and the problems involved in applying it to
analyzing the deterrent effect of capital punishment, see L. Friedman, The Use of Multiple Re-
gression Analysis to Test for a Deterrent Effect on Captial Punishment: Prospects and Problems
(Oct. 1975) (on file at Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley).
[Vol. 4 1: No. I
PUNISHMENT AND CRIME
The economic theory of deterrence suggests that the list of explanatory
variables should include measures of the quality of legitimate and illegitimate
opportunities in addition to variables which characterize the probability and
severity of punishment. Other variables, reflecting cultural differences among
jurisdictions, should be included in a complete specification of a crime equa-
tion. However, the number and kinds of explanatory variables which can be
included in an econometric specification are limited by the available data.
They are also limited by the statistical requirement that reasonably precise
estimates of parameter values can be obtained only when the number of ob-
servations is substantially greater than the number of explanatory variables
included in the equation.
One of the better examples of the use of multivariate regression analysis
to study crime is Issac Ehrlich's analysis of interstate differences in Index
crime rates for 1960.63 His specification of the mathematical relationship be-
tween crime rates and explanatory variables includes the following explana-
tory variables for each type of crime: (1) P, the number of offenders imprisoned
per offenses known; (2) T, the average time served by offenders in state pris-
ons; (3) the median income of families (supposedly a measure of the quality
of illicit opportunities); (4) the percentage of families below one-half the me-
dian income (a measure of the quality of legitimate opportunities); and (5) the
percentage of non-whites in the population. Using a log linear form of the
regression equation, he finds that there is a negative partial relationship
across states between the crime rate for each type of crime and the probability
P and severity T of punishment for that crime. (See Table I) Estimated elas-
ticities with respect to P range from -.9 (robbery) to -.1 (homicide). These
estimates are of course imprecise; however, Ehrlich uses a standard statistical
technique to demonstrate that one can be very confident that the "true" elas-
ticities with respect to P are negative to some degree (i.e., that the deterrence
effect is "working"). The results with respect to the severity are not so clear,
except for the crimes of burglary and larceny-his results do not rule out the
possibility that changes in severity have no relationship to the rate of commis-
sion of the other Index crimes.
The attractiveness of this regression approach is that it appears to gener-
ate estimates of the magnitude of the deterrence 4 effect, however imprecise,
in a context which controls for the possible distorting effects of other causal
factors. The obvious questions are whether Ehrlich and other scholars who
have used regression analysis have actually used appropriate and accurate
measures of the factors they think are important, and whether they have ac-
63. Ehrlich, supra note 30.
64. Once again, it should be noted that to label these estimates as estimates of a deterrent
effect is not strictly correct, since logically they must be influenced by incapacitation effects. Ehr-
lich recognizes this fact and includes a brief discussion of its implications. Id. at 535.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES OF INDEX CRIMES WITH RESPECT TO CHANGES
IN THE PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT (BASED ON A
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION USING 1960 DATA ON STATES)
Crime Elasticit
Crime with respect to ... P T
Homicide -. 3 -. 1*
Rape -.6 -. 2*
Assault -. 3 -. 2*
Robbery -. 9 -. 2*
Burglary -. 5 -. 9
Larceny - 1 -.3
Auto Theft -. 2 -. 2*
* The standard error of estimate is more than one-half the estimated coefficient. which indicates
that the probability that the true parameter is zero exceeds five per cent.
Source: Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81
J. POL. ECON. 521, 546-47 (1973). The estimated elasticities are based on a weighted ordinary least
squares estimate of the regression specification discussed in) the text.
tually succeeded in controlling for all the important factors which may distort
the deterrence relationship. One does not have to be very sophisticated to
find fault with Ehrlich's specification, or to suggest other factors which should
be controlled for. 6 5 It is certainly suggestive that published multivariate re-
gression analyses based on a variety of data sets have for the most part found
a negative partial relationship between crime rates and the probability of ar-
rest or incarceration; 66 however, it is not by any means conclusive evidence of
a deterrence effect.
6 7
65. There are two issues here. First, the variables which Ehrlich selects to represent the fac-
tors which he thinks are important are inadequate. There is no measure of the sanction threat to
statutory juveniles, for instance, even though juveniles commit about forty-five per cent of the
Index crimes. His measure of illegitimate opportunities (i.e., the median income of the state)
seems like a very weak proxy indeed, especially for crimes of violence. Second, there are no
doubt many other factors which could be important and which are not controlled for. Differences
in cultural norms among states may be important, for example, and are especially salient to the
extent that such differences reflect the historical behavior and effectiveness of the state's criminal
justice system. Bayley argues that Japan's low crime rate and high clearance rate are both the
result of a culture which stresses compliance to authority and (hence) cooperation with police. See
Learning about Crime--the Japanese Experience, 44 PUB. INTEREST 55 (Summer 1976).
66. Nagin, supra note 57.
67. This doubt is reinforced by the supposition that it is much easier for a scholar to get a
study published in an economics journal if the empirical findings seem to support the theoretical
prediction, grounded in economic theory, that the threat of punishment deters crime. This bias
among editors may stimulate a certain amount of "fishing" in the data among scholars. Klein
expresses this point well: "To an economist the question of whether punishment deters seems
curious. We are taught from a very young age to draw demand curves sloping downward and
supply curves sloping upward. And the presumption is if empirical work does not pick up these
price effects, there are most likely some deficiencies in the work." Klein, Comment, in THE
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Further sources of doubt about the validity of correlational studies of de-
terrence are perhaps even more troublesome than the "control" problem.
First, there is a possibility that the empirically observed negative relationships
between crime rates and threat levels are a statistical artifact resulting from
errors in the measurement of crime rates. Second, the interpretation of these
negative correlations, even if they are "real," is in some doubt: There is con-
siderable evidence for the hypothesis that crime rates influence threat levels,
and that this causal process (the converse of the deterrence process) may ac-
count for all or part of the observed correlations.
C. Data Problems
The poor quality and inadequacy of published estimates of crime rates
have been discussed and documented so often that there is no need to repeat
the sad story here." The significance of this data problem for deterrence
studies is twofold: first, that published categories of crime data often do not
correspond to magnitudes which would be desirable for the study of deter-
rence; second, that the errors in measurement which certainly reduce the
precision with which relationships can be estimated may also produce artifac-
tual relationships between crime and other variables of interest.
The first problem is clearly evident in studies that attempt to test the de-
terrent effect of capital punishment. There are no published data on the
number of capital offenses committed in a jurisdiction, and all studies of
which I am aware have been forced to utilize the "murder and non-negligent
manslaughter" data collected by the FBI, or some similar comprehensive
statistic on murder. Only a fraction of these murders are capital crimes in
retentionist districts, and there is no reason to believe that this fraction is
constant across jurisdictions or over time.6" Similar problems arise in the con-
text of deterrence studies of other crimes and sanctions, the most serious of
which is that data on crime rates do not permit juvenile crimes to be distin-
guished. Since juveniles presumably respond differently to threats and op-
portunities than adults, and certainly are treated differently by the criminal
ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 106 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1973). There are, however, several
important correlational stUdies which do report a failtC to find evidence of a deterrent effect.
See Passell, 7lhe Deterrent Effect if the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1975);
Forst, Paiticipation in Illegitimate Activities: Further Empirical Fiindings, 2 PoCY' ANALYsis 477 (1976).
68. See, e.g., T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N ON LAw\ ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, -HE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 96; Reiss, Assessing the Current Crme Wave, in CRIME IN URBAN SOCIETY
23 (B. McLennan, ed. 1970).
69. Ehrlich, supra note 30, at 406, assumes that the nulmber of capital mturders C is related to
the total number of utulders M by the relationship
C=-e -Xt +
where t represents chronological time in years and A denotes -random errors of reporting or
identifying murders."
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justice system than are adults, it requires some heroic assumptions indeed
to warrant lumping juvenile and adult offenses into a single explanatory
equation.
The second problem, that errors in the measurement of crime rates can
generate artifactual negative correlations between measured crime rates and
measures of the sanction threat, results from the types of variables used to
measure the probability of punishment. The denominators of such ratios as
the arrest rate, incarceration rate, or clearance rate are the measured crime
rates, implying that this explanatory variable will be perturbed by the same
errors in measurement as the dependent variable (the crime rate), but in the
opposite direction. An error which exaggerates the true crime rate will result
in an under-estimate of the true incarceration rate. An error which yields an
underestimate of the true crime rate will yield an overestimate of the true
incarceration rate. If a data set which is being used to study deterrence in-
cludes some jurisdictions whose official crime statistics exaggerate the true
crime rate, and others which understate the true rate, these errors will tend to
generate a negative correlation between crime and the probability of incarcer-
ation which may be erroneously interpreted as evidence of a deterrent effect.
The argument must be modified slightly to account for the fact that
measured crime rates almost always understate the true rate, simply because
published measures are based on "crimes reported to the police."7" A substan-
tial fraction of serious crimes (excluding only homicide and perhaps auto
theft) are never reported to the police and hence cannot be included in offi-
cial tabulations. If every jurisdiction's official measure of crime understated
the true rate by the same fraction, deterrence studies could safely ignore the
data problem (this type of proportional error will not affect the correlation
between the two variables). But the problem of an artifactual "deterrence"
relationship is present so long as some jurisdictions report a larger fraction of
their true crime rates than others; those which report a relatively high (low)
proportion of crimes will tend to have a relatively low (high) computed in-
carceration rate.
Evidence that the ratio of the true crime rate to the reported crime rate
differs widely among jurisdictions can be deduced from comparing the crime
rates calculated from some recent victimization surveys of major American
cities with the official crime rates for these cities.7 1 This comparison is made
70. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT (published annually).
7 1. LEAA reports, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS IN 13 AMERICAN CITIES (June 1975); CRIM-
INAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEYS IN THE NATION'S FIVE LARGEST CITIES (April 1975): CRIME IN
EIGHT AMERICAN CITIES, ADVANCE REPORT (July 1974). Uniform Crime Reports, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1973-UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1974); CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
1972-UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1973); CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 1971-UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS (1972).
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in Table 1I for the crime of burglary. While it is subject to certain kinds of
error, the victimization survey data is almost certainly a more consistent and
accurate measure of the true burglary rates in these cities. 72 The considerable
TABLE 11
A COMPARISON OF Uniform Crime Reports AND NATIONAL CRIME PANEL BURGLARY DATA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Burglary Burglary Clearance Clearance
Rate Rate UCRI Rate Rate
City UCR NCP NCP UCR NCP
Chicago 15 68 .22 .29 .065
Detroit 41 106 .39 .08 .031
Los Angeles 34 94 .37 .20 .073
New York 26 71 .37 .19 .071
Philadelphia 15 73 .21 .28 .058
Atlanta 43 119 .36 .24 .085
Baltimore 26 81 .32 .28 .090
Cleveland 20 78 .26 .11 .029
Dallas 35 94 .37 .24 .084
Denver 41 104 .40 .25 .101
Newark 47 107 .44 .15 .065
Portland 37 100 .37 .12 .045
St. Louis 42 89 .47 .32 .150
Boston 31 109 .29 .13 .037
Buffalo 18 64 .28 .32 .087
Cincinnati 32 118 .27 .41 .112
Houston 31 96 .32 .12 .038
Miami 36 68 .53 .10 .054
Milwaukee 11 83 .13 .44 .056
Minneapolis 34 112 .30 .12 .035
New Orleans 22 72 .30 .20 .060
Oakland 57 142 .40 .10 .039
Pittsburgh 18 57 .32 .17 .053
San Diego 21 79 .27 .41 .111
San Francisco 28 84 .33 .15 .049
Washington, D.C. 23 55 .42 .20 .083
Definitions and Sources:
Columns I and 2 are burglary rates per 100,000 residents aged twelve and over for various
years: 1972 for the first five cities, September 197 I-August 1972 for the next eight cities, and
1973 for the final thirteen cities. The number of burglaries was taken from various issues of the
Uniform Crime Reports (for column 1) and various Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
reports on the National Crime Panel Surveys (for column 2). Central city population estimates
were taken from the NCP reports.
Clearance figures are unpublished tabulations made by the FBI. Column 4 is the ratio of
burglary clearances to burglaries reported in the UCR; column 5 is the ratio of the burglary clear-
ances to burglaries reported by the NCP.
Column 3 is the ratio of column 1 to column 2 (or, equivalently, the ratio of column 5 to
column 4), and represents the fraction of all burglaries which were reported to the police and
recorded by them.
72. See the discussion in Skogan, Measurement Problems in Official and Surwv Crime Rates, 3 J.
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differences in the ratios (column 3) are thus primarily the result of differing
propensities of victims in the twenty-six cities to report burglaries to the
police, coupled perhaps with differing degrees of efficiency and accuracy in
the record-keeping activities of the police departments in these cities.
The possibility that intercity Variability in burglary reporting rates could
produce a spurious negative correlation between burglary rates and sanction
threat levels was checked using the clearance rate data given in columns 4 and
5. The number of clearances for burglary in each city was available from
unpublished tabulations prepared by the FBI."3 Clearance rates were calcu-
CRIM. JUST. 17 (1975). In intercity comparisons to test theories of crime causation, what is needed
is a measure of crime rate which bears some consistent (proportional) relationship to the "true"
rate. The much noted "dark figure" of crime-the large fraction of' crimes which are never re-
ported to the police, or are not recorded by the police if reported-is of no concern for this type
of research so long as the underreporting is uniform across cities. For example, if 30 per cent of
burglaries are reported in official police crime statistics in each city under study, then the inter-
city pattern of burglars will be revealed just as precisely as if 100 per cent of burglaries were
reported in each city. A precise measure of this pattern is all that is needed to analyze the relative
importance of various criminogenic factors.
Neither the Uniform Crime Reports nor the victimization surveys are thought to measure the
true crime rates in these cities. My assertion is that the crime rates estimated from the victimiza-
tion surveys, at least foir the crime of burglary, bear a more consistent relationship to the true
crime rates than is true for the official police statistics published in the Uniform Crime Reports.
The main sources of error in the official crime statistics are that victims do not report a large
ftraction of crimes to the police, and that the police in some jurisdictions do not record all the
crimes which are reported to them. There is good reason to think that intercity differences in the
'professionalism" of police departments make police statistics highly inconsistent proxies for the
true crime rate. For example. Skogan estimates that the probability that a burglary reported to
the police would be recorded in the official police statistics ranged from 79 per cent (St. Louis
and Miami) down to 22 per cent (Milwaukee)--see Crime and Crime Rates, in SAMPLE SURVEYS OF
TH4E VICTIMS OF CRIME (W. Skogan, ed. 1976).
The main source of potential error in the victinization survey estimates of the amount of crime
in a city are: (1) Memory errors: Respondents are asked to relate the incidents in which they were
victimized during the preceding year. The' may forget some incidents which did occur during
the requested time frame, and report other incidents which actually occurred more than one year
before the interview; furthermore, some respondents may simply be more cooperative than
others. (2) Commuter problems: Crimes actually committed in the city against nonresidents will
of course be omitted from the victimization surveys, which only interview residents. (3) Sampling
problems: Some groups, especially young males, tend to be hard to locate and will be underrep-
resented in the sample. The second problem may be particularly important for crimes such as
robbery and larceny, and will cause inconsistency problems across cities to the extent that cities
differ in the amount of commuting, tourism, etc. But neither the second nor third problems will
be salient for the crime of burglary which I am considering. The first problem-that of memory
and cooperativeness of respondents--will not cause intercity inconsistency in estimated crime
rates assuming that these problems tend to be fairly uniform across cities. Inconsistency problems
could arise if interviewers in some cities were better trained or more persistent than in others, or
if residents of some cities tended to be more cooperative than in others.
My conclusion is that at least for the crime of burglary, there is good reason to place greater
faith in the victimization survey data than in police reports.
73. "Clearances" are the sun of "clearances by arrest" and "exceptional clearances." A crime
is "cleared by arrest" when at least one person is arrested, charged, and turned over to the court
for prosecution. A case is "exceptionally cleared" when the identity and the location of the offen-
der are "known" to the police, but they cannot make an arrest due to the offender's death,
confession of someone who is already under custody, refusal of the victim to cooperate, and so
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lated using the error prone Uniform Crime Reports estimate of the number of
burglaries as a denominator (column 5). The correlation between the UCR
reported burglary rates and the clearance rates based on these figures is -.47,
apparently substantial support for the deterrence notion. However, the corre-
lation between the burglary rate and clearance rate when National Crime
Panel (NCP) data are used is only -. 15, which is not significantly different
from zero.' The "evidence" evaporates when more accurate data are used.
The problems introduced by errors in the measure of crime rates will be
more or less severe depending on the degree to which the measure of crime
used in a study bears an unstable relationship to the true crime rate. The
problem is not severe for a crime which is nearly always reported to the police
(such as homicide or auto theft), assuming that police departments' record
keeping systems are reliable; the problem is much more important for crimes
such as burglary, especially when different jurisdictions are being compared.
The results of the simple experiment reported above should help to deter
scholars from being overly confident in estimates of the deterrent effect
which are based on such unreliable data.
D. The Influence of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels
A final source of doubt concerning the evidence for deterrence generated
by correlational studies is that the negative partial correlations between crime
and threat levels, even if they survive the "control" problem and the errors in
measurement problem, could be the result of some causal process which is
unrelated to the deterrence mechanism. Two mechanisms have been sug-
gested by which changes in the crime rate could cause changes in the opposite
direction in the probability and severity of punishment, thus producing a
on. The number of arrests is usually considered to be a more reliable indicator of police activity
than the number of clearances, because there is more room for police discretion in determining
whether a case is cleared. Police departments may abuse this discretion to differing degrees.
Unfortunately, arrest statistics for burglary were not available to this author by city. Overall, the
number of clearances is somewhat higher (about 25 per cent) than the number of arrests in large
cities.
74. Let BUCH and BNCP represent the UCR and NCP burglary rates, and CuRc and CNcp repres-
ent the UCR and NCP clearance rates. The following ordinary least squares regression results
were obtained from the data in Table 2:
BURC = 4.2. + 5.4 Cuc R2 = .22
(2.0)
BNCP =9.7 + 11.1 CNcp R ' = .02
(15.3)
The numbers in parentheses represent the estimated standard error of the coefficient estimate. It
should be noted that the coefficient on the arrest or clearance probability is negative and signifi-
cant when victimization survey data are used for the crime of robbery, as reported in J. WILSON
and B. BOLAND, Crme, in THE URBAN PREDICAMENT (1976). (Wilson and Boland do not compare
their result with what thes would have gotten using UCR data.) One suspects that the victimiza-
tion survey data are more error prone for robbery than for burglary (see note 72 supra), if so,
then the negative correlation may be a statistical artifact.
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negative correlation between crime and threat levels.75 The first is a produc-
tion function notion. The criminal justice system has as inputs both employees
and crimes, and from these inputs produces arrests, convictions, and sanc-
tions; if the number of crimes increases without a corresponding increase in
the other inputs to the system, then we would expect (due to the principle of
diminishing marginal productivity) that the number of arrests and so on
would increase, but by an amount which is less than proportional to the in-
crease in crimes. Hence the increase in crime would result in a reduction in
the arrest and conviction rates-at least until the jurisdiction had time to re-
spond by increasing capacity. A clear example of this short run phenomenon
is an urban riot, in which "the probability of apprehension of individual riot-
ers, as well as of offenders committing other crimes, decreases considerably
below its normal level due to the excessive load on local police units."76 In
general, this "loading" mechanism would produce a negative short run rela-
tionship between crime rates and threat levels to the extent that there are
unexpected changes in the crime rates.
In the long run, jurisdictions can respond to a change in the crime rate by
making the appropriate change in the criminal justice system budget. 77 There
is no necessary reason in the long run why jurisdictions with large increases in
crime rates should produce relatively low rates of arrests and convictions.
However, casual observation would suggest that the public's willingness to al-
locate resources to crime prevention is not sufficiently responsive to changes
in the level of crime to maintain a constant threat level. For example, jurisdic-
tions with the highest crime rates tend to have the least police investigatory
effort per crime, the longest court backlogs, the greatest resort to plea bar-
gaining, and so on.7 1 One illustration of this effect is given in Figure II, which
depicts an interstate comparison of Index crime rates with the number of
Index crimes per police employee ("CRIMES/COP"). The curve in Figure II
represents the curve which best "fits" the points plotted there. According to
this functional relationship, a 10 percent increase in the Index crime rate is
associated with a 5.6 per cent increase in the number of Index crimes per
police employee.7 9 While it is true that relatively high crime states have a
75. Ehrlich, supra note 30, at 540; Carr-Hill & Stern, An Econometric Model of the Supply and
Control of Recorded Offenses in England and Wales, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 289 (1973).
76. Ehrlich, supra note 75, at 540.
77. One stud), showed that the trend in total United States expenditures for law enforcement
during the 1960s was not affected by the large increases in crime rates during the 1960s. The
result was a dramatic drop in clearance rates during this period. See Votey & Phillips, Police
Effectiveness and the Production Function for Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (1972).
78. See, for example, the descriptions of the day-to-day activities of rural and urban pros-
ecutors in the Wall St. J., May 5, 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1. The rural prosecutor was able to devote
considerable time to even very minor cases. No rigorous demonstration of these hypothesized
patterns is available in the literature, however.
79. The ordinary least squares regression line is
Log CRIMES 1.87 +.56 Log (CRIME RATE) R2 = .63
COP (.062)
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FIGURE II
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDEX CRIME RATES AND THE
NUMBER OF CRIMES PER POLICE EMPLOYEE
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relatively large number of police per capita,8 " Figure II demonstrates that
they have a relatively small number of police per crime. This evidence that
police budgets are not very responsive to changes in the crime rate appears to
provide a plausible explanation for observed negative relationships between
80. The interstate relationship between the number of police employees per capita and the
number of crimes per capita is
cops = 93.0 + .044 (CRIME RATE) R, = .54
100,000 Pop. (.006)
m 0
C') 0
m
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crime rates and sanction threat levels, an explanation which is clearly competi-
tive with the "deterrence" interpretation of such observed relationships. 8'
How can we know whether a negative correlation between crime and sanc-
tion threat levels, assuming it is not a statistical artifact, is the result of a
deterrence process, the "public choice" mechanism, the "loading" mechanism,
or all three? This is a rather deep statistical question which has been discussed
extensively in the literature and which has motivated an effort to identify
factors which influence criminal justice system budgets in an attempt to dis-
tinguish the budget effect from the deterrence effect. To date, this effort
must be judged a failure. 2
E. Conclusions
The objective of the correlational studies discussed in this section is to
extract estimates of the magnitude of the simple deterrence effect for each of
the Index crimes from published data on crime rates, criminal justice threat
levels, and other criminogenic variables. The studies have used a variety of
statistical techniques, including matching, simple correlation, multivariate re-
gression, and more sophisticated methods. Many of these studies have re-
ported evidence that the probability and (less consistently) the severity of
punishment have the expected inhibiting influence on crime rates. In some
cases the estimated magnitude of the deterrence effect is quite large. These
studies are of great interest to criminologists and may serve to influence the
predilections of criminal justice policymakers.
There are numerous conceptual and statistical problems with these studies,
some of which were discussed above. The focus on simple deterrence has
diverted attention from the long-term effects of law enforcement on crime.
The accuracy of the deterrence effects estimated by the techniques is ques-
tionable due to the problems of distinguishing the deterrence process from
other processes which may cause threat levels to be negatively related to crime
rates, the problems introduced by inadequate and inaccurate crime statistics,
and the problem of controlling for other criminogenic factors which may dis-
tort the deterrence effect.
My conclusion from reviewing these studies is that they have produced
little persuasive evidence concerning the size or even the existence of the de-
terrence mechanism. This is not to say that we can conclude that the deter-
rence mechanism is not important. Indeed, Sellin's negative conclusions con-
81. This type of hypothetical explanation for observed "deterrence" relationships has been
used to critique Ehrlich's empirical work on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Ehrlich,
supra note 61. See Hoenack, Kudrle, & Sjoquist, Some Difficulties in the Estimation of the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment (1977) (unpublished manuscript on file at Institute of Policy Sciences
and Public Affairs, Duke University).
82. Nagin, supra note 51, draws this conclusion after a careful technical critique of this litera-
ture.
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cerning the marginal deterrence effect of the death penalty are no more
persuasive (perhaps even less so) than analyses which appear to demonstrate
the existence of a deterrence effect, either in this context or in- the context of
other crimes and sanctions. Rather, my conclusion is that these studies have
not produced reliable evidence to date.
A number of correlational studies of the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment were submitted to the Supreme Court in briefs in Gregg v. Georgia
and related cases.83 These studies appear to have had little influence on the
majority of the Court, who, as mentioned above, resorted to common sense in
assessing the deterrence issue. In my view, this was an entirely appropriate
response, given the problems inherent in the approach used by these studies.
IV
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF DETERRENCE II:
EVALUATING "NATURAL EXPERIMENTS"
The principal alternative to correlational studies is the empirical study of
"quasi-experiments": sudden, dramatic changes in the law or criminal justice
policy which can be presumed to change the public's perception of the cer-
tainty and/or severity of punishment for some class of offenses. Frequently
cited examples include police strikes in Liverpool (1919) and Montreal (1956)
and the mass arrest of the Copenhagen police force by the Nazis in 1944.84
The huge increase in crime rates which followed each of these events is per-
suasive evidence that the threat of punishment has a substantial inhibiting
effect on crime. More recently, there have been a number of studies of the
effects of changes in criminal justice policy, some of which are reviewed here.
The principal advantage of studying such events, when compared with the
alternative of a correlational study, is that it is often easier to make a persua-
sive case that observed changes in the crime rate are actually the result of the
induced change in the threat level, and not the result of other factors such as
those that have not been controlled for, data problems, or some causal pro-
cess which is unrelated to the deterrence mechanism. Each of these problems
can still be troublesome, however, and this advantage is merely one of degree.
A second advantage of this approach is that it yields information about
problems involving the implementation of changes in the law or criminal jus-
tice system policy. It contributes to our knowledge concerning the technology
of threat production as well as the effect of threats on behavior. There are
many instances in which "get tough" programs have failed to reduce crime,
not because of a failure in the deterrence mechanism but simply because the
programs never succeeded in increasing the objective or perceived threat of
criminal sanction.
83. See Brief for United States as Anicus Curiae, supra note 2.
84. J. ANDENAES, supra note 26, at 50.
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The principal disadvantage of such studies is that they lack the generality
of correlational studies. First, changes in justice policy which are likely to pro-
duce unequivocal results must involve large changes of a sort that would not
be feasible for most jurisdictions most of the time. Small changes in policy are
likely to have small effects which would be difficult to identify and measure,
given the "noisiness" and inaccuracy of crime data. For example, it would
be hard to imagine that the short-term effect of the Furman decision s5 on
homicide rates could be sorted out from the many other sources of variability
in homicide rates; the decision invalidated existing capital punishment laws at
a time when the threat of execution was already negligible.8 6 Second, major
changes in policy, when they do occur, are each limited to one time and geo-
graphical area-a particular precinct, state, or country-and the nature and
magnitude of the observed effects may be heavily influenced by the idiosyn-
cracies of that time and place. Whether the findings serve as a valid predic-
tion of the effects of a similar policy change in a different jurisdiction must
remain questionable.
The discussion below focuses on four of the best and most interesting
studies of the effects of criminal justice policy changes: the Kansas City Pre-
ventive Patrol Experiment, analyses of the effects of increases in the policing
of the 20th Precinct and the subway system in New York City, and finally an
evaluation of the British Road Safety Act of 1967.
A. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment
This experiment was undertaken with the primary objective of testing the
efficacy of police preventive patrol in deterring crime." "Police themselves,
the general public, and elected officials have always believed that the presence
or potential presence of police officers on patrol severely inhibits criminal
activity."8 The deterrence effect would presumably be the result of an in-
creased probability of an "on-scene" arrest for crimes visible from the street
(e.g., auto theft, certain kinds of larceny, assaults and robberies occurring
out-of-doors), and an increased probability of arrest for these and other types
of crime due to a reduced police response time to citizen calls for assistance.
The experiment, which ran from October 1, 1972 to September 30, 1973,
involved a contiguous fifteen-beat area of Kansas City, Missouri. Five of the
beats (the control group) received the usual amount of routine preventive
patrol; five were given no preventive patrol, and in the remaining five beats,
85. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 283 (1972).
86. There were no executions between 1967 and 1976.
87. See generally G. KELLIG, T. PATE, D. DIECKMAN, & C. BROWN, THE KANSAS CITY PRE-
VENTIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT (1974).
88. Id. at 1.
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preventive patrol activity was raised to a supernormal level that was supposed
to increase police visibility to two to three times its usual level.8 9 A careful
evaluation of crime rates in these three areas revealed the now famous find-
ing that no significant differences in crime rates resulted from the experi-
mental manipulation. The reaction of James Newman, assistant chief of the
Kansas City Police Department, may typify a common interpretation of this
finding: "We just went out and proved that the liberal cliche is correct:
crime is caused by social conditions which very frequently are beyond the
control of police."9"'
There are two plausible explanations for the failure of intensive preven-
tive patrol to reduce crime: either (1) crime is not responsive to an increase in
the threat level (apparently the interpretation of Assistant Chief Newman), or
(2) the experimental increase in preventive patrol activity in fact failed to in-
crease the level of threat. Fortunately, the experiment generated sufficient
data to allow us to choose between these possible explanations. The finding
that neither police response time to citizen calls nor the arrest rate differed
among the three groups of beats 1 suggests that the second explanation is the
correct one.
The question of why intensive preventive patrol activities failed to produce
any measurable increase in the threat level has been recently investigated.9 2
The answer, which must be viewed as tentative until it has been subjected to
criticism by other experts, is that the experimental design was flawed in the
sense that it did not succeed in producing large differences among the three
groups of beats in visible patrol presence or in travel time necessary to re-
spond to calls. Police cars patrolling the perimeters of the "no preventive pa-
trol" beats, and responding to calls in those beats, apparently produced a sub-
stantial visible patrol presence which was not much different than those beats
that were receiving the normal amount of preventive patrol. The value of
preventive patrol was not adequately tested by this experiment; a fortiori, it
produced no evidence concerning the marginal deterrence value of increasing
police manning levels in an urban area. 93 This latter issue has been investi-
gated in two recent studies reviewed below.
89. Id. at 5.
90. N.Y. Times, November 11, 1973, at 67, col. 1.
91. G. KELLING, T. PATE, D. DIECKMAN, & C. BROWN, supra note 87 at 23, 36.
92. Larson, What Happened to Patrol Operations in Kansas City? A Review of The Kansas City
Preventive Patrol Experiment, 3 J. CRIM. JUsT. 267 (1975).
93. The authors note that it is unfortunate that some news media reports suggested the ex-
perimental results justified reducing the level of policing in a city. "Those who drew manpower
reduction conclusions from the preliminary findings assumed that if the crime prevention
strategies currently being used did not work, no crime prevention strategies would work." G.
KELLING, T. PATE, D. DIECKMAN, & C. BROWN, supra note 87, at 49.
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B. The Effects of Increased Police Manning
A perennial problem faced by city councils is to evaluate police depart-
ment requests for increased manpower. Since a primary function of the police
is to reduce crime, information on the potential productivity of additional
policemen in this regard is essential to making wise decisions.
The dramatic evidence of the chaos which occurs during a police strike
suggests that firing the entire police force is not a practical option for
policymakers, but beyond that there is little in the way of information which is
relevant to deciding the appropriate size of the police force. Two recent
studies, however, are informative.
1. Subway Crime94
In April 1965 New York's Mayor Wagner ordered a large increase in the
size of the Transit Authority Police Department (TAPD) in order to stem the
rapidly increasing subway crime rate. The objective specified by Mayor
Wagner was that every subway station and every train be policed between
8:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. Meeting this objective required increasing the
number of TAPD patrolmen on duty during these hours from two hundred
to about eight hundred. 95 This huge increase would be expected to have a
large deterrent effect on nighttime subway crime, and indeed "the number of
felonies reported at night reached, at their lowest, a level only one-third as
high as that attained in the year preceding the manning increase. Six years
later, reported rates for nearly all crime types between 8:00 p.m. and 4:00
a.m. had not returned to their 1964 and early 1965 levels." ' In particular,
the number of nighttime token booth robberies fell from twenty-three during
the first quarter of 1965 to a total of nine for the remaining three quarters of
the year.
The sudden large increase in police manning, followed immediately by a
large drop in the crime rate, is persuasive evidence that the causal mechanism
was indeed deterrence. This explanation is further supported by the fact that
the felony arrest rate increased substantially following the manning increase.9 7
However, two competing explanations deserve mention: the regression effect
and the possibility of systematic errors in the crime data.
The "regression effect" (no relation to "multivariate regression analysis")
in this case refers to the tendency of unusual deviations from the long-run
trend of a variable (e.g., the subway crime rate) to be followed by a spontane-
94. Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, The Impact of Police Activity on Subway Crme, 3 URB.
ANALYSIS 173 (1974).
95. Id. at 178.
96. Id. at 182.
97. The number of felony, arrests remained about constant: Coupled with the substantial drop
in the number of felonies, the implication is that the arrest rate increased.
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otis reversion to the mean. The year before Mayor Wagner decreed the
increase in police manning of the night trains, subway felony rates had
increased over 50 per cent, and this apparently unusual increase was what
provoked Mayor Wagner's decision. 98 Is it possible that the drop in felony
rates which followed the increase in police manning was simply a spontane-
ous regression effect which would have occurred in any case?99 One method
of controlling for this possibility is to compare the trend in nighttime subway
felony rates with the trend in daytime felony subway rates, since the trends
in these two crime rates are presumably influenced by the same set of
criminogenic factors. The trend in daytime felony rates should serve as an
indication of what would have happened to nighttime rates if there has been
no increase in police presence. The finding from this comparison is equivocal:
During the first year following the nighttime increase in police presence, the
daytime felony rate fell almost as much as the nighttime rate, even though
there were no significant changes in policing of day trains.""' However, in
subsequent years the daytime rate rebounded to its former trend line while
the nighttime rate grew much more slowly. t" Instead of being a regression
effect, the initial drop in daytime felony rates may have been a "phantom"
deterrence effect: Potential subway robbers may have been temporarily de-
terred from daytime crimes as well as nighttime crimes by the misperception that
police manning levels had been raised throughout the twenty-four hours.12
Subsequent increases in the daytime felony rate would suggest that this phan-
tom effect faded as the true pattern of police manning became evident.
Data problems in this evaluation could stem from two sources. First, the
propensity of victims to report crimes could have been affected by the in-
crease in police presence. But if this change actually occurred, it would most
likely lead to an inflation of the reported nighttime felony rates and a conse-
quent underestimate of the true impact of the additional police. Furthermore,
one would expect that 100 per cent of one type of subway crime-token
booth robberies-are reported to the police under any level of police man-
98. Id. at 179.
99. A well known example is the finding that the drop in auto casualties which followed a
crackdown on speeding on Connecticut highways was most likely due to the regression effect.
Fhe crackdown was initiated due to an unusual increase in road fatalities, and the subsequent
drop in fatalities would be expected even in the absence of public intervention. See Campbell &
Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experniental Analysis, 3 L. &
Soc'y REV. 33 (1968).
100. Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, supra note 94, at 185.
101. During the first eight months of 1973 the reported hourly felony rate was three times as
high during the daytime as it was during the nighttime police saturation period: in 1964, before
the decision to introduce saturation police manning of the night trains, the felony rates were
about the same over the course of the day. See N.Y. 1Times, October 10, 1973, at 49, col. 7.
102. Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, supra note 94. at 185.
103. J. Chaiken, What's Known About Deterrent Effects of Police Activities, at 5 (1976) (Rand
Paper P-5735).
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ning, and the reported rate of token booth robberies fell even more during
1965 then the reported rates of other types of robberies. A second and more
insidious measurement problem did occur, however: A TAPD official in
charge of recording subway crimes allegedly changed the time when some
nighttime robberies occurred in his official reports, with the apparent intent
of producing an exaggerated impression of the effectiveness of the saturation
manning program. The magnitude and duration of this intentional error in
measurement are apparently insufficient to account for more than a fraction
of the observed effect. 103
2. Crime in the 20th Precinct in New York Ci.
'
ty1 4
"For the purpose of studying increased manpower as a deterrent force, on
October 18, 1966, the police increased the number of patrolmen assigned to
the 20th Precinct located on the West Side of Manhattan from about 200 to
300 patrolmen (the average increase was actually about 40 percent), while
manpower elsewhere in the City remained fairly constant.""" A comparison
of seasonally adjusted average weekly reported felony rates during the six-
month period before the change with a thirteen-month period following the
change revealed that "inside" felonies (those which would be invisible from
the street) increased by eleven per week, while "outside" felonies decreased by
eleven per week." 6 Thus the apparent net effect was to change felony pat-
terns while leaving the overall felony rate unchanged. However, the 40 per
cent increase in police manning of the 20th Precinct occurred at a time when
felony rates in other parts of the city were increasing. There is good reason to
believe, then, that the increase in police manning did deter crime in the 20th
Precinct, coincidentally by an amount just sufficient to cancel out changes in
other criminogenic factors which tended to increase crime. It was estimated
that if police manpower levels had not been increased, inside felonies would
have been five per cent higher and outside felonies 36 per cent higher than
they actually were reported to be during the thirteen months following the
manpower increase." 7 If these estimates are valid, it would appear that the
deterrent effect was quite substantial.
There is no explanation in the report of why the New York Police De-
104. S. PRESS, SOME EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN POLICE MANPOWER IN THE 20TH PRECINCT OF
NEW YoRK CITY (1971).
105. Id. at 2. This experiment was similar to Operation 25, in which the police force in a high
crime district of Manhattan was doubled for four months in 1954. Some crime rates reportedly
fell rather dramatically during this period. See Wilson, Crime and Law Enforcement, in ACENDA FOR
THE NATION 179, 187 (K. Gordon ed. 1968).
106. S. PRESS, supra note 104 at 73 app. A.8.
107. Id. at 16. For each type of crime, the change in incidence in the 20th Precinct was
compared with the change in incidence in several other precincts. The comparison precincts were
chosen according to criteria of similarity to the 20th Precinct with respect to the crime rate for
the crime in question, population, police manning levels and miles of highway.
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partment chose the 20th Precinct as the site of this quasi-experiment. If it was
chosen because it had been subject to unusually rapid increases in crime rates
prior to the change, then there would be some danger that the estimated
deterrent effect was actually the result of a regression effect. However, the
validity of the deterrence interpretation is supported by the finding that in-
door crime was affected much less than outdoor crime. This result would be
expected if the primary effect of the increase in police presence was to in-
crease the potential criminals' perception of the probability of being arrested
for an outdoor crime. In fact, this perception would have been accurate: The
arrest rate for inside felonies only increased from 5.6 per cent to 6.4 per cent
while the arrest rate for outside felonies increased from 5.9 per cent to 9.6
per cent.'"
Both the subway and the 20th Precinct studies offer persuasive evidence
that increasing the level of police manning in a specified area can produce an
increase in the felony arrest rate and a substantial inhibiting effect on serious
crime. While these results are certainly interesting to criminologists, it should
be noted that they do not provide all the information needed to judge
whether the police manning increases were worthwhile. At least some of the
criminals who were deterred by the extra policemen from committing of-
fenses on the subway or in the 20th Precinct may simply have been displaced
to other targets in other areas of the city. This possibility is entirely consistent
with deterrence theory, and seems highly plausible. Both studies attempted to
identify and measure displacement effects. Crime rates in areas contiguous to
the 20th Precinct were analyzed for evidence of an unusual increase, and a
relatively small effect was actually found in the case of one of these (the Cen-
tral Park Precinct). Displaced subway crime is virtually impossible to detect
because it would necessarily be a very small fraction of above-ground crime.
The subway crime evaluation did, however, detect an interesting interaction
between subway and bus robberies.""
C. The British Road Safety Act of 1967"11
The British Road Safety Act of 1967 (BRSA) enacted a precise definition
of drunken driving-driving with blood alcohol content in excess of .08 per
cent-in order to overcome the considerable difficulties in obtaining drunken
driving convictions under the earlier, vaguer law. The Act defined a wide
range of circumstances under which policemen could stop a car for the pur-
pose of administering a breath-alyzer test to the driver. If the driver "failed"
or refused this test, he could be arrested, given a more precise laboratory test,
108. Calculated from the statistics given in Id. at 73 app. A.8.
109. Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, supra note 94, at 188.
110. Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1973).
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and ultimately be subjected to a mandatory one year's suspension of his driv-
ers license (in addition to other possible penalties). Following passage of the
BRSA the government spent £ 350,000 in a massive publicity campaign to
explain the new law to the public. This publicity effort, coupled with the
many news reports generated by the passage and implementation of the law,
apparently succeeded in persuading the British public that under the new Act
there was a high probability that a drunk driver would be arrested and de-
prived of his license. Laurence Ross's evaluation of the effects of the BRSA
provides the strongest evidence I know that a moderate change in govern-
mental policy can, under the appropriate circumstances, produce an effective
deterrent to illegal activities.
While the incidence of drunken driving cannot be measured directly, the
close causal link between drunkenness and road accidents suggests that the
auto accident casualty rate, which is measured with a high degree of accuracy,
is a good proxy for the incidence of this offense. The casualty rate is in any
event an appropriate statistic with which to evaluate the effect of the Act,
since its ultimate purpose was to reduce road casualties. The initial success of
the BRSA in this regard is strikingly indicated by the fact that the road fatal-
ity rate for October 1967 (the first month the Act was in force) was 25 per
cent below the September rate.1" ' That this drop (and the relatively low fatal-
ity rate which obtained thereafter) was the result of the deterrence effect of
the law, rather than the influence of some other factor, is supported by the
following considerations. (1) The magnitude and suddenness of the reduction
precludes the possibility that it was a random fluctuation. 2 (2) As one would
expect, all of the reduction in casualties occurred during weekends. The ca-
sualty rate on weekdays, when drunk driving is rare, did not change notice-
ably. '1 3 (3) The road fatality rate fell more than the rate of lesser casual-
ties, as one would expect from previous studies which showed that accidents
where inebriation is a factor are more serious on the average than other acci-
dents. '4 (4) Surveys taken before and after the BRSA was enacted showed an
increase in the number of people who reported walking, rather than driving,
to their local pub." 5 (5) A smaller fraction of drivers killed in auto accidents
after October 1967 had high blood alcohol levels than had been true before
this date.' 6
Unfortunately, the British public's perception that the implementation of
the BRSA would result in drunk drivers being arrested and convicted with a
111. ld. at 32.
112. Id. at 30.
113. Id. at 33.
114. Id. at 32.
115. Id. at 64.
116. Id. at 64.
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high degree of certainty proved to be false. The British police were not ag-
gressive about enforcing the law. Breathalyzer tests were administered spar-
ingly, usually when there was evidence from his driving that a driver was
inebriated. The Act did facilitate gaining convictions for drunk driving rather
than plea bargained lesser charges, such as careless or reckless driving, and
the average severity of punishment for those who were arrested was thereby
increased. But "it appears that the Road Safety Act, contrary to popular im-
pression, did not greatly increase the likelihood of police action in the event
of drinking and driving."' i 17
The perhaps inevitable result was that public perceptions of the legal
threat to drunk driving gradually came into conformity with reality, and by
1970 the deterrent effect of the BRSA was no longer evident in British road
fatality statistics. 18 The deterrent effect was the result of an illusion produced
by the initial publicity, and this illusion could not be supported long given the
refusal of the police to make good the threat. In any event, the initial deter-
rent effect of the law has been irrefutably demonstrated, and serves as a cor-
nerstone of the empirical deterrence literature.
CONCLUSION
The focus of this review has been on evaluating what we now know about
the effects of the criminal justice system activities on the crime rate, and how
we came to know it. A related subject, which has been neglected here as well
as in the literature, is the effect of private protection activities on the crime
rate, and the important set of issues concerning the interactions between the
private and public efforts to reduce crime. t ' The ultimate goal is to develop
a complete model which incorporates both demand and supply aspects of the
production of crime.
The empirical literature on the preventive effects of punishment is highly
uneven. Rehabilitation and other "specific" effects of punishment lend them-
selves to systematic experimentation in a way that general preventive mech-
anisms do not, and implications of the rehabilitation and clehabilitation studies
are correspondingly stronger and more reliable. The correlational studies of
117. Id. at 48.
118. Ross based his conclusions concerning the long-run effects of the BRSA on a comparison
of the actual highway death rate in 1970 with an extrapolation of the pre-BRSA trend line. This
procedure is not very reliable, and Ross's conclusions in this one respect should be viewed accord-
ingly.
119. These questions are one aspect of a subdiscipline which goes under the "victimology" ru-
bric. For recent contributions, see Bartel, supra note 23; Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, supra
note 94 (for an analysis of the effects of efforts to protect subway token booths and buses against
robber)); A. Schneider, Evaluation of the Portland Neighborhood-Based Anti-Burglary Pro-
gram (1975) (unpublished paper on file at Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs, Duke
University); Komesar, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Victims of Crime, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 301
(1973).
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the simple deterrence mechanism, while in some cases sophisticated and care-
fully done, have, in my judgment, contributed very little to our fund of knowl-
edge concerning this important mechanism. What "facts" we do have about
deterrence come from the study of natural or quasi-experiments.
The conclusions? First, most of the rehabilitation programs which have
been studied carefully appear to have failed, but Ann Witte's article in this
issue suggests that providing prisoners with a steady job and some income
may be effective in reducing recidivism. 2 In any event, there is little support
for the notion that imprisonment interferes with rehabilitation. Second,
the evidence on the effectiveness of the simple deterrence mechanism clearly
precludes the flat claim that deterrence does not work. It has "worked," some-
times with a strikingly large effect, in a number of circumstances. The evi-
dence is very spotty, however, and we are far short of a set of reliable quan-
titative estimates of the responsiveness of various kinds of crime to changes in
the threat level. In many cases, the short-term reduction in crime resulting
from increasing the threat level may not be sufficient to justify the costs of
the policy change. Third, there is almost no scientific knowledge concerning
the long-term effects of punishment on the amount of crime, and yet the
long-term effects (enculturation, habit formation, respect for the law) may be
the most important.
There is no threat that criminology will obtain the quantitative (or even
qualitative) precision of the hard sciences, although some recent research has
proved valuable to policymakers and further effort may prove productive.
For the foreseeable future, careful a priori reasoning, descriptive evidence on
human nature and criminogenic processes, and common sense will rightfully
remain the principal sources of evidence in the debate over criminal justice
policy.
120. Witte, supra note 6.
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